// Comments from the Fellows

Chris Oleson Ph.D

A Brief Primer on the Natural Law

If there is one ethical doctrine that is alien to the bleak landscape of contemporary moral discourse, it is surely the classical doctrine of natural law. Only on the rarest of occasions does one hear of a politician or mainstream political commentator even mention the concept, much less show any sign of taking it seriously or recognizing its relevance to discussions about the common good of society.

There was, of course, a brief noteworthy exception awhile back during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings when "the natural law" received its fifteen minutes of television fame. Joseph Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was extremely concerned that Justice Thomas might adhere to something approximating a traditional understanding of natural law and be intent upon applying it in his jurisprudence. Biden was willing to accept the term, he was quick to add, so long as what it signified was the procedural enforcement of unencumbered individualism.

However, as even Senator Biden was probably aware, this is not what the doctrine articulated by the perennial philosophical tradition entails. Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas were not exactly champions of a vision of man as an autonomous self chiefly in need of secular space in order to maximize his non-rational preferences.

But if the perennial doctors did not posit the naked public square as the ideal social order demanded by our nature, what did they teach about natural law? In what way is it a rational basis for moral deliberation about human action? Here the perplexity extends beyond chairs of senate judiciary committees to include a great number of people. This is both lamentable and a bit paradoxical, given that the natural law is supposed to be a rule and measure of human life naturally open to human reason as such. We shall have to return to this latter point later.

For now, let us briefly run through some of the more basic points of natural law doctrine in order that we might develop a more reflective understanding of what it means. We shall first tackle the "natural" part, and then the "law" part.

Natural law is natural because it is a set of moral precepts drawn from an understanding of what is proper to our human nature . What do we mean by our "nature" here? The term signifies the specific kind of thing that we are. Our nature is the source within us of the faculties, inclinations, and activities which are specific and proper to us as human beings. It is because we have the nature that we do that certain things are good, fulfilling, and perfective for us, and other things are bad, harmful, and destructive. We use this sense of "nature" even when referring of non-living things, as when we speak of "the nature of friendship," or "the nature of a triangle." Nature here thus signifies the essence of a thing.

There is nothing spooky or mystical about our having such a nature or knowing what it is. Through our experience of life, our reason sees that it is "natural" for human beings to have, for example, two eyes, ten fingers, the emotion of fear, and the ability to understand. Additionally, human beings naturally have an inclination toward various forms of friendship so that they will associate in ways which are good both for themselves individually and for the species as a whole. These abilities, properties, and inclinations are brought forth by our nature for our good. They are there for a reason, which is to enable us to realize the kind of life that is proper and fulfilling for human beings.

Thus, we human beings have hands with fingers and opposable thumbs in order that we might effectively grasp and manipulate things. We have eyes by nature so that we will be able to see. We are naturally able to experience the emotion of fear so that we may avoid those things which are harmful to ourselves. Finally, we have the capacity to reason so that we will be able to understand the true, and see through the false.

Everyone recognizes that this is so and acts upon this recognition. Parents rightly mourn when their children are born blind or with less than ten fingers or are unable to develop mentally. They realize that their children have been tragically deprived of significant natural goods. There is no room here for academic cavils about these goods being "relative," "perspectival," or "socially constructed." Everyone is rightly grieved at the deprivation of what was supposed to be.

It is likewise with the emotion of fear. We all recognize that this emotion is natural, good, and important when experienced in a way which conduces to its natural purpose, which is to steer us clear of what will harm our life. However, to experience fear in a habitually excessive way or towards things which are not truly fearful is to behave in a way contrary to human nature. We call this cowardice and blame the one showing it in varying degrees depending upon the circumstances. Thus, our ability to be fearful has a purpose, and its expression is meant to conform to that purpose.

Thus, our reason can discern within our nature certain inborn parts, powers and inclinations toward ends which are naturally good and perfective. It can also see that there is a hierarchy among these parts, powers, and inclinations. For example, we instinctually place our hands in front of our face to avoid an incoming blow because we naturally know that our head is a more important part of our body than our hands. We can have some kind of life without our hands, but we can have no kind of life without our head.

Similarly, our emotions, which are meant to be expressed in certain way, cannot judge or govern themselves. They simply express themselves in accordance with our habits. It is our reason that judges whether (to stay with our example) our present experience of fear is excessive or misdirected. It is the task of our intellect to judge whether we need to overcome a fear because it is not rational. When our fear is expressed in accordance with reason, we are called brave and possess the natural human excellence known as courage.

From this we can see that reason is a privileged faculty within us and has the special role of discerning the proper ends and goods of human nature. From this understanding of our natural inclinations and powers, human reason naturally draws certain conclusions about how it ought to act so as to conform to them. This is where reason begins to see certain "laws" that it must respect if its activity is to realize those ends which are naturally good for a human being.

Because my intellect can see, for example, that my natural inclination toward social existence is purposively directed toward certain goods which are necessary for a complete and fulfilled human life, it recognizes a rule and measure ordering my relations with others. Acts like murder, rape, and lying are irreconcilable with human society, which my nature intends as a necessary good for me. Therefore my reason forbids these acts as contrary to my nature and its proper acts and ends.

Further reflection on the part of my reason yields the insight that unconscious natures do not act to realize certain definite ends without there being an intelligence behind that nature as the cause of this natural intentionality and purposefulness. To act contrary then to my natural ends is to act contrary not simply to precepts which my natural ends impose upon me, but to this Intellect which authored my nature and its inborn inclinations. Thus, behind "the laws of nature" stands, as Jefferson famously put it in the Declaration of Independence, "Nature's God."

It is at this point that we must raise that paradox which I mentioned earlier by emphasizing a second sense in which natural law is "natural." Because it is, as I said, a set of moral precepts rooted in our human nature and grasped by the faculty of human reason, natural law is naturally known , which is to say, it is a set of moral truths commonly available to all human beings independent of any claims of faith or divine revelation.

Yet here is where the paradox emerges, for there is, as I mentioned, hardly anything more widely ignored or frequently rejected when proposed in contemporary discussion than the classical doctrine of natural law. How then, it will be asked, can one reconcile the truth of a doctrine which claims that there is a moral law naturally knowable to all human beings with both its widespread repudiation and the affirmation of many contrary goods to those it affirms? Do not these two positions contradict one another?

Chris Oleson Ph.D . is associate professor of philosophy for the Legion of Christ at their Center for Higher Studies in Thornwood, New York. He teaches the history of modern philosophy, the philosophy of culture, as well as various courses in moral and political philosophy. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the Catholic University of America and a Master of Arts in Religion from Yale Divinity School.